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PUTTING THE ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE IN THE
CROSSHAIRS: HOW THE GLOBAL CONSERVATION
CRISIS DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR LACEY ACT
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN LAWS
JONATHAN GONZALEZ*
INTRODUCTION
Amidst the widespread outcry1 over the death of Cecil the Lion,
the subject of an Oxford University lion study, at the hands of now decried
dentist, Walter Palmer,2 many onlookers on social media and in the press
failed to report on the larger conservation crisis within their sights.
While Cecil served as a momentary beacon of light to illuminate one criti-
cal instance of conservation failure,3 other similar instances of poaching
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2017; B.A. Political Science and English,
University of South Florida, 2014. The author would like to thank Professor Linda
Malone for her invaluable review and commentary on international criminal law. The
author also greatly appreciates the support of his family and friends and the dedication
of the staff of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review—without
either of which, publication of this Note would not have been possible.
1 See Christina Capecchi & Katie Rogers, Killer of Cecil the Lion Finds Out That He Is a
Target Now, of Internet Vigilantism, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/07/30/us/cecil-the-lion-walter-palmer.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HLZ5-XKHX]; see
also Todd Melby, U.S. Dentist Who Killed Zimbabwean Lion Cecil Returns to Work,
REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/us-dentist-who-killed-zim
babwean-lion-cecil-returns-to-work/ar-AAe3tZx [https://perma.cc/NHU6-2DLC].
2 See Marc Dorian et al., What Happened in the Harrowing Hours Before Cecil the Lion
Was Killed, ABC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/happened
-harrowing-hours-cecil-lion-killed/story?id=33044279 [https://perma.cc/2NUF-JA9S]; see
also Michael E. Miller, Zimbabwe Charges Farmer Over Killing of Cecil the Lion, but not
American Dentist, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/08/19/zimbabwe-charges-farmer-over-killing-of-cecil-the
-lion-but-not-american-dentist/ [https://perma.cc/NJL8-L473]; Smita Nordwall, American
Faces Poaching Charge in Popular Zimbabwe Lion’s Death, VOICE OF AMERICA (July 28,
2015), http://www.voanews.com/content/american-faces-poaching-charge-zimbabwe-lion
-death/2882703.html [https://perma.cc/RH2Q-RX3T]; Bringing Justice for Cecil the Lion,
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://aldf.org/cases-campaigns/features/bringing-justice
-for-cecil-the-lion/ [https://perma.cc/AP23-2NVY] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
3 Cecil’s death inspired Senator Bob Menendez (D. N.J.) to introduce legislation to protect
species that U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service considers listing under the Endangered Species
Act. See S. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015).
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rarely received media attention. Since 2009, both Tanzania and Mozam-
bique have witnessed the disappearance of over half of their elephant pop-
ulations due to illegal poaching resulting from recent spikes in foreign
ivory demand.4 Similarly, poachers took the lives of an estimated 1,215
southern white rhinoceroses in 2014, which equates to a 9,000% increase
in poaching activity since 2007.5 While increased ivory demand from Asia
has driven the rise in poaching, many poachers come from the United
States, and U.S. demand for products of the illegal wildlife trade remains
strong.6 In fact, the United States ranks second globally in consumption
of products derived from the illegal wildlife trade.7
Fortunately, the United States imposes a stringent legal regime
designed to punish U.S. citizens for engaging in illegal poaching activities
abroad under the Lacey Act, the lesser-known cousin of the Endangered
Species Act.8 The Lacey Act promulgates civil and criminal penalties for
the transportation in interstate commerce of species or by-products of
animals taken in violation of foreign conservation laws.9 For example,
Walter Palmer’s slaying of Cecil the Lion in violation of Zimbabwean law
could potentially lead to prosecution under the Lacey Act if he had planned
to bring part of the lion back as a trophy.10 Additionally, federal prosecu-
tors have successfully utilized conspiracy charges to enforce the Lacey Act,
and conspiracy appears to occupy an important role within prosecutors’
4 Omar Mohammed, A New Census Reveals the Poaching Crisis in Africa Is Worse Than
We Thought, QUARTZ AFRICA (June 3, 2015), http://qz.com/418923/the-poaching-crisis-is
-worsening-in-some-african-countries-to-meet-chinese-demand-for-ivory/ [https://perma
.cc/5NJS-GP4P].
5 Karl Mathiesen, Can Anything Stop the Rhino Poaching Crisis?, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/23/can-anything-stop
-the-rhino-poaching-crisis [https://perma.cc/ZB9Z-YK7T].
6 Poaching American Security: Impacts of the Illegal Wildlife Trade: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 64 (2008) (statement of Steven R. Galster,
Director of Field Operations, Wildlife Alliance).
7 Alejandra Goyenechea & Rosa Indenbaum, Deadly Traffic: The U.S. Plays an Unwitting
Role in Illegal Wildlife Trade, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.de
fendersblog.org/2015/03/deadly-traffic-u-s-plays-unwitting-role-illegal-wildlife-trade/
[https://perma.cc/98K4-YPWY].
8 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2015).
9 Id.
10 See Ayesha Rascoe & Julia Edwards, Cecil the Lion Case Charts New Territory for U.S.
Wildlife Law, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2015 3:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08
/04/us-zimbabwe-wildlife-lion-usa-idUSKCN0Q924Z20150804 [https://perma.cc/2XEY-82RT];
see also Christine Fisher, Conspiring to Violate the Lacey Act, 32 ENVTL. L. 475 (2002)
(providing a theoretical analysis of conspiracy charges under the Lacey Act).
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Lacey Act toolboxes, including in high profile poaching cases.11 Thus, the
Lacey Act serves a critical role within the boarder scope of U.S. conserva-
tion policy by expanding the ability of federal prosecutors to challenge the
actions of U.S. citizens abroad that threaten foreign conservation efforts.
While the Endangered Species Act embodies the United States’
chief species conservation priorities, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
(“Fish & Wildlife”) lists new species under the Endangered Species Act
only in reaction to conservation crises.12 This “emergency-room mental-
ity” results in stabilizing a species in crisis, but fails to provide preventa-
tive treatment to stave off endangerment in the first place.13 In this regard,
the environmental laws of foreign governments (both national and local
jurisdictions) play a crucial role because they incorporate local knowledge
about trends in conservation and help prevent ecological crises before
they occur, which Congress recognized as a justification for the incorpo-
ration of foreign conservation laws under the Lacey Act.14 But if Ameri-
can citizens abroad can evade punishment under those foreign laws due
to gaps in enforcement, then the benefit to environmental protection
evaporates.15 Similarly, foreign governments lack the capability to exer-
cise jurisdiction over American consumers of products derived from the
illegal wildlife trade.16 The Lacey Act protects the proactive conservation
efforts of other nations by deterring American citizens abroad from break-
ing foreign conservation laws, and it forces Americans to educate them-
selves about those laws prior to adventuring abroad or purchasing illegally
taken products.17 This holds especially true in the context of a multibillion
11 See U.S. v. Bengis, 611 F. App’x. 5 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding order requiring defendant
to pay restitution for conspiracy to illegally harvest South African rock lobsters); U.S. v.
Delph, 371 F. App’x 63 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to violate the
Lacey Act in harvesting an illegally large number of spiny lobsters); see also Indictment,
U.S. v. Groenewald, Criminal No. 214-CR-508-WKW (M.D. Ala. Oct. 16, 2014) (charging
an African safari company with conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act by arranging an
illegal hunt for an African white rhinoceros).
12 Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law,
30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 204 (2006).
13 Id.
14 H.Rep. 71-7 at 181–82 (1929).
15 C. Parks Gilbert, III, The Lacey Act: A Vintage Conservation Tool Still Vital in Today’s
Global Economy, 29-WTR NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3 (2003).
16 See Julia C. Shepard, The Lacey Act: Extraterritorial Application Based on an Antitrust
Paradigm, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 84 (1992).
17 See id. (arguing that the Lacey Act provides a deterrent to the taking of wildlife abroad);
see also Fisher, supra note 10, at 481 (“The [Lacey] Act is touted as the premier weapon
in the fight against wildlife trafficking and the ‘government’s key mechanism for deter-
ring crimes against wildlife’ ”).
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dollar illegal wildlife trafficking and poaching industry, which generates
much of its profit from moving goods in international trade, a prerequi-
site for Lacey Act violations.18
Despite the Lacey Act’s effective means of buttressing foreign
conservation efforts, many critics seek to declaw the Lacey Act by strip-
ping its foreign enforcement provisions.19 While some recent cases20
demonstrate the Lacey Act’s potential for overcriminalization, the dra-
matic increase in overseas poaching activity reinforces the argument for
the Lacey Act as a deterrence mechanism to ensure that American citi-
zens, well-intentioned or not, abide by foreign conservation laws while
abroad and refrain from purchasing items taken illegally.21 Admittedly,
the functional incorporation of every foreign conservation law can result
in the prosecution of citizens ignorant of foreign laws.22 Despite this
possibility, the preservation of the global environment should drive U.S.
policy in this instance. Environmental conservation has global repercus-
sions, and as a result, preservation laws must continue to reach globally.23
Congress should not weaken the Lacey Act’s commitment to global con-
servation efforts by constraining its incorporation of foreign laws because
it promulgates a comprehensive rather than piecemeal approach to con-
servation efforts, serves as an additional deterrent for the violation of
18 See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 5.
19 See infra Section I.C. See generally C. Jarrett Dieterle, The Lacey Act: A Case Study in
the Mechanics of Overcriminalization, 102 GEO. L.J. 1279 (2014) (arguing for restrictions
on penalties under the Lacey Act including a reevaluation of the mens rea standards
applied by the Act); Paul Larkin, Defanging the Lacey Act: The Freedom from Over-
Criminalization and Unjust Seizures Act of 2012, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/defanging-the-lacey-act-the-free
dom-from-over-criminalization-and-unjust-seizures-act-of-2012 [https://perma.cc/CY4R
-UBEN] (advocating for passage of The Freedom from Over-Criminalization and Unjust
Seizures Act of 2012).
20 See infra Section I.C. for a discussion of the motivations behind proposed amendments
to the Lacey Act.
21 See Shepard, supra note 16, at 84. See also Fisher, supra note 10, at 481.
22 See Dieterle, supra note 19; Larkin, supra note 19; Victor J. Rocco, Wildlife Conser-
vation Under the Lacey Act: International Cooperation or Legal Imperialism?, 80 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 10, 13–14 (2008).
23 See Trevor Krost, The World’s Laws in American Justice: The Foreign Provisions of the
2008 Lacey Act Amendments, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 55, 77–78 (2013); Robert
S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful
Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 83 (1995); see also Anastasia Telesetsky,
Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
Fishing and Transnational Organized Crime, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 986 (2014) (proposing
that other nations adopt versions of the U.S. Lacey Act to create a unified, global strategy
against wildlife trafficking).
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foreign laws, and provides a more realistic possibility of prosecution of
American citizens than in foreign jurisdictions.24
Section I of this Note provides a brief overview of the Lacey Act’s
history and an overview of the proposed amendments. Section II dis-
cusses the extent of the global conservation crisis from the perspective
of U.S. and foreign laws. Section III evaluates the strength of the Lacey
Act’s deterrence mechanism, both with and without foreign law incorpo-
ration, and argues that the government can reasonably conduct prosecu-
tions of foreign law violations. Finally, this Note concludes that the Lacey
Act’s incorporation of foreign laws remains necessary to global conservation
governance despite the potential for overcriminalization.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LACEY ACT AND ITS PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS
Congress passed the Lacey Act in the hopes that it would accom-
plish three primary policy objectives: 1) the prevention of the spread of
invasive species; 2) the conservation of species; and 3) the enforcement
of domestic gaming laws.25 While the scope of this Note does not extend
to the Lacey Act’s invasive species provisions, the development of the
Lacey Act as a conservation tool and the history behind the Lacey Act’s
incorporation of foreign conservation laws demonstrate the importance
of the Lacey Act to U.S. conservation policy as a whole.26
A. Congressman Lacey’s Pot Hunting Bill
Congressman John Lacey stewarded the passage of the Lacey Act
in 1900 as the first mechanism to enforce interstate violations of state
and local wildlife laws.27 Many state and local governments had enacted
conservation laws aimed at preserving their populations of common game
birds; however, pot hunters28 quickly learned that if they killed birds in
one state and sold the skin and feathers in a neighboring state, they
could avoid state and local enforcement, as well as federal enforcement
24 See Shepard, supra note 16, at 84; see also Fisher, supra note 10, at 481.
25 Gilbert, supra note 15, at 3.
26 A number of scholars have written more extensive histories of the Lacey Act; however,
this Note will only touch on events relevant to the discussion of foreign law incorporation.
See Dieterle, supra note 19; Anderson, supra note 23, at 83.
27 See 33 CONG. REC. 4871–4872 (1900).
28 See WEBSTER’S 1913 DICTIONARY, http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/Pot%20
hunter (defining “pot hunter” as “a hunter who shoots game for the table or market”).
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due to a lack of jurisdiction.29 Congressman Lacey recognized this juris-
dictional problem and proposed to federally enforce local laws against pot
hunters by using the sale of bird byproducts as an interstate commerce
hook to provide federal jurisdiction.30 Shortly after the Act’s passage,
appellate courts began to review the first Lacey Act prosecutions and
agreed that the interstate commerce clause could grant federal jurisdic-
tion over pot hunters selling bird parts in jurisdictions other than the
state in which the hunter made the kill.31
B. Incorporation of Foreign Laws
Interest in protecting birds continued throughout the early twen-
tieth century, and in 1916, the United States began negotiations with
Great Britain on behalf of Canada for the protection of birds migrating
between the two countries.32 These negotiations culminated in an agree-
ment between the United States and Great Britain,33 and Congress
passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.34
Subsequently, the Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp
Act of 1935 (“Duck Stamp Act”) sought to extend the success of Congress-
man Lacey’s enforcement strategy into the international arena.35 Con-
gress used the Duck Stamp Act to broaden the scope of the Lacey Act to
incorporate foreign laws as predicates for Lacey Act violations.36 In addi-
tion to the Duck Stamp Act’s increased jurisdictional scope, Congress
also granted authority to federal agents to directly enforce the Lacey Act,
which aggrandized the scope of federal conservation efforts.37 This broad
29 Id.
30 Id. Congressman Lacey and other supporters of the Lacey Act decried the fact that one
could illegally hunt birds in Iowa and Georgia and then sell the byproducts in Pennsylvania
and Delaware without repercussions. See also H.R. REP. NO. 56-474 (1900).
31 See Rupert v. U.S., 181 F. 87 (8th Cir. 1910) (holding that the commerce clause validated
the Lacey Act’s grant of federal jurisdiction).
32 George Cameron Coggins, The Resurrection and Expansion of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 169 (1979).
33 Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migra-
tory Birds, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702. Note that Congress later incorpo-
rated other migratory bird conventions by statute including agreements with Mexico
(1936), Japan (1972), and Russia (1976). 16 U.S.C. §  703 (2015).
34 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2015).
35 79 CONG. REC. 14,490 (1935) (proposing to extend the Lacey Act’s jurisdiction to foreign
commerce).
36 Id.; see also Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act, ch. 261, § 242, 49
Stat. 378 (1935).
37 H.R. REP. NO. 886, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
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enforcement strategy culminated in the 1969 and 1981 amendments,
which expanded the Lacey Act to cover a larger number of species with the
intention of utilizing both the Endangered Species Act and the Lacey Act
to assist other countries in the enforcement of their conservation laws.38
C. The 2008 Amendments and Proposed FOCUS Legislation
In 2008, Congress again expanded the scope of the Lacey Act beyond
the 1981 amendments by broadening the definition of “plant” to include
“any wild member of the plant kingdom.”39 Senator Wyden (D-OR), the
sponsor of the amendment, wanted to curb international illegal logging ac-
tivities, which he saw as both environmentally destructive and threatening
to the domestic logging market.40 A conglomerate of industry and environ-
mental organizations from the National Hardwood Lumber Association to
the Defenders of Wildlife and Sierra Club supported the amendments.41
Since passage of the 2008 amendments, Fish & Wildlife has demon-
strated its determination to punish illegal logging practices abroad.42 For
example, the Virginia-based Lumber Liquidators, Inc. signed a plea agree-
ment that will levy the single largest fine ever issued ($13.18 million dol-
lars) for illegal lumber trafficking and for the manipulation of permits to
harvest wood from the habitat of endangered Siberian tigers in Russia.43
While the Lacey Act has incorporated foreign laws since the 1930s, avid
enforcement of the new illegal logging provisions has generated significant
38 See S. REP. NO. 91-526 (discussing the expansion of the Lacey Act as a companion policy
to the proposed Endangered Species Act); see also Act of Nov. 16, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79,
§ 9(b), 95 Stat. 1073, 1079 (1981 Amendment providing protections for fish and plant life
protected under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora).
39 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f) (2012). The Lacey Act’s definition of plants does exclude certain cate-
gories of plants, such as plants intended for scientific use. 16 U.S.C. § 3371(f)(2) (2012).
40 153 CONG. REC. 22,089 (2007); see also S. 1930, 110th Cong. (2007). The Senate ulti-
mately did not pass Wyden’s bill, but instead attached the Lacey Act Amendments to the
2008 Farm Bill. Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923, 1291 (2008).
41 153 CONG. REC. 22,089 (2007).
42 Caitlin Clarke & Adam Grant, Gibson Guitar Logging Bust Demonstrates Lacey Act’s Effec-
tiveness, WORLD RES. INST. (Aug. 10, 2012), http://wri.org/blog/2012/08/gibson-guitar-logging
-bust-demonstrates-lacey-act%E2%80%99s-effectiveness [https://perma.cc/UE2A-N6YC].
43 United States v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. 15-cr-126, plea agreement filed (E.D. Va.
Oct. 22, 2015); Lumber Liquidators Inc. Pleads Guilty to Environmental Crimes and Agrees
to Pay More Than $13 Million in Fines, Forfeiture and Community Service Payments,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/lumber-liquidators
-inc-pleads-guilty-environmental-crimes-and-agrees-pay-more-13-million [https://perma
.cc/GW6Q-48XT].
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controversy over the extent of power provided to federal prosecutors and
the potential for “overcriminalization” such power creates.44 One major
reason for this recent scrutiny of the Lacey Act’s foreign enforcement
provisions may stem from the fact that the number of potential Lacey Act
violations has substantially increased since the passage of the 2008
amendments.45 The United States consumes more wood products than
any other nation and, more significantly, imports large quantities of lumber
from countries known to have problems with illegal logging activities.46
A second reason comes from the decision of federal courts to expand the
scope of the Lacey Act by interpreting the term “foreign law” to include
“regulations and other such legally binding provisions that foreign gov-
ernments may promulgate.”47
Much of this concern arose after the recent civil forfeiture action
taken against Gibson Guitar Corporation,48 which involved the importa-
tion of ebony wood in violation of the laws of Madagascar and India.49
Fish & Wildlife claimed that a Gibson Guitar employee had informed the
company that its imports from Madagascar may have resulted from illegal
logging activities; however, Gibson Guitar took no action and continued
to import wood from Madagascar.50 On August 6, 2012, Gibson Guitar
settled for $300,000 to avoid further prosecution under the Lacey Act.51
Gibson Guitar’s CEO and others have speculated that Fish & Wildlife ag-
gressively prosecuted the case under pressure from environmental groups
looking to make a dramatic example of a large corporation.52 Regardless
44 See, e.g., Dieterle, supra note 19 (arguing for restrictions on penalties under the Lacey Act
including a reevaluation of the mens rea standards applied by the Act); Larkin, supra note
19 (advocating for The Freedom from Over-Criminalization and Unjust Seizures Act of 2012).
45 Rachel Saltzman, Establishing a “Due Care” Standard Under the Lacey Act Amendments
of 2008, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2010).
46 Id.
47 U.S. v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003).
48 The government never filed formal charges against Gibson Guitar; however, the govern-
ment subjected its stock to a civil forfeiture action. See Verified Complaint in Rem, United
States v. 25 Bundles of Indian Ebony Wood, No. 11-cv-00913 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2011).
49 Paul Larkin, The FOCUS Act and Federal Law Enforcement, THE HERITAGE FOUNDA-
TION (May 7, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/focus-act-overcrimi
nalization-and-federal-law-enforcement#_edn3 [https://perma.cc/BZ5S-2NNJ].
50 Richard Black, Gibson Settles Discord on Timber, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-19153588 [https://perma.cc/LH8T-BWCU].
51 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Gibson Guitar Corp. Agrees to Resolve Investigation into Lacey
Act Violations, (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/gibson-guitar-corp-agrees-re
solve-investigation-lacey-act-violations [https://perma.cc/FT4L-GXE7].
52 See Bill Frezza, Lumber Union Protectionists Incited SWAT Raid On My Factory, Says
Gibson Guitar CEO, FORBES (May 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrezza/2014
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of Fish & Wildlife’s motivations for aggressive prosecution, the Gibson
Guitar forfeiture action and subsequent settlement sent a clear signal
that the federal government intended to fully prosecute violations of the
2008 amendments, which has sparked fear amongst even private owners
of wooden instruments of questionable origins that the government may
one day come for their guitars.53
Responding to these concerns, several lawmakers have introduced
bills intended to limit the scope of the Lacey Act’s foreign enforcement
provisions.54 The most recent attempt to amend the Lacey Act comes
from Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), who has twice proposed an amendment
to the Act known as the Freedom from Over-Criminalization and Unjust
Seizures Act (“FOCUS Act”), which would remove the Act’s foreign en-
forcement provisions.55 Paul and other opponents of the Lacey Act’s
foreign enforcement provisions point to examples of prosecutorial over-
reach such as the Gibson Guitar civil forfeiture and settlement.56 Oppo-
nents of foreign law incorporation also cite the case of U.S. v. McNab, in
which federal prosecutors indicted fisherman for taking lobsters in violation
of Honduran laws even though Honduran government representatives
testified at trial that their government no longer enforced those restric-
tions.57 These cases, however, should not incite Congress to overturn the
Lacey Act’s global vision for environmental conservation. The Gibson
Guitar settlement and McNab merely provide a cautionary tale for prosecu-
tors and should encourage less aggressive enforcement for innocent owners
/05/26/lumber-union-protectionists-incited-swat-raid-on-my-factory-says-gibson-guitar
-ceo/ [https://perma.cc/WY66-9R4D]; Black, supra note 50.
53 See Eric Felton, Guitar Frets: Environmental Enforcement Leaves Musicians in Fear,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
053111904787404576530520471223268 [https://pe rma.cc/ECC5-C5XA].
54 See The Freedom from Over-Criminalization and Unjust Seizures (FOCUS) Act, S.
1019, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing to strike all references within the Lacey Act to
foreign laws); The Retailers and Entertainers Lacey Implementation and Enforcement
Fairness (RELIEF) Act H.R. 3210, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing to prevent retroactive
application of the Lacey Act and limit the enforcement of foreign laws to laws purporting
to protect conservation); see also Joseph Furlett, The Insufficiency of the Musical Instru-
ment Passport Program Under CITES and the Lacey Act: The Need for a Centralized
Wood Title and Certification System for Manufactured Wood Products and Wooden Musi-
cal Instruments, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 495, 511–13 (2015) (describing the FOCUS and
RELIEF Acts).
55 S. 1019, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 2062, 112th Cong. (2011).
56 See Daniel J. Dew, Senator Rand Paul: Overcriminalization Champion, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/senator
-rand-paul-overcriminalization-champion [https://perma.cc/42SC-EBDS].
57 McNab, 331 F.3d at 1228, 1239.
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and unintentional violators. Congressman Lacey realized over a century
ago that government should act when the existence of a species comes
under threat, and while he did not originally intend to father a compre-
hensive conservation scheme, the scope of the global conservation crisis
today warrants global solutions.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE GLOBAL CONSERVATION CRISIS AND
SOLUTIONS UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) entered into force in 1975, the world
has adopted a global understanding of the illicit trade in wildlife.58 Un-
fortunately, systemic problems of governance and corruption often plague
countries with large quantities of valuable natural resources.59 Many
international actors have attempted to curb the supply and identify the
means of transport for illegal wildlife traffickers, but such efforts have
often proved unsuccessful.60 This section further elaborates on the global
nature of this problem and discusses forward-thinking solutions cur-
rently under implementation.
A. An Overview of the Global Nature of the Conservation Fight:
Why the Solution Must Include Global Enforcement Efforts
While some conservation issues remain localized, such as the de-
struction of the habitat of a single rare species because of development or
deforestation, the international trade in illegal wildlife represents a sub-
stantial threat to global conservation efforts.61 Due to the growing likeli-
hood of the extinction or near extinction of several species that criminal
enterprises commonly target, such as sharks (for fins) and rhinoceroses
(for tusks), fragile ecosystems could come under severe strain due to the
loss of biodiversity.62 Additionally, illegal logging activities contribute to
58 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE, (Apr. 2014), https://www.fws.gov/international/pdf/factsheet-cites-overview-2014
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN6Y-44XQ].
59 Katherine Lawson & Alex Vines, Global Impacts of the Illegal Wildlife Trade: The Costs
of Crime, Insecurity, and Institutional Erosion, CHATHAM HOUSE, 9–10 (Feb. 2014), https://
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0214Wildlife.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94CQ-M2PB].
60 Id. at 8–9.
61 See Anderson, supra note 23, at 31–33.
62 TANYA WYATT, WILDLIFE TRAFFICKING: A DECONSTRUCTION OF THE CRIME, THE VICTIMS
AND THE OFFENDERS, 39–40 (Diane Westerhuis et al. eds., 2013).
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deforestation, reducing the ability of forests to serve as heat sinks for rising
CO2 levels, speeding the slow but inevitable march of climate change.
63
The illegal wildlife trade also raises national security concerns.64
Transnational criminal enterprises reap enormous profits from the illegal
wildlife trade, and their profits rival drug trafficking revenues to the
tune of $8–10 billion annually.65 Additionally, illegal fishing and illegal
logging activities generate, respectively, anywhere between $10–23 billion
annually and $30–100 billion annually.66 The average rhinoceros horn
can generate even higher revenue than the sale of gold or platinum by
weight.67 Given the incredibly lucrative global market and lack of strong
enforcement mechanisms, no one should wonder why organized criminal
organizations, including paramilitary and terrorist groups, engage in
these activities.68 For example, a captive taken by the Lord’s Resistance
Army, a Central African militant group recently regaled in the press for
its widespread use of child soldiers, recounted several instances in which
members of the group poached wild elephants and traded food for ivory.69
The UN Security Council has also discussed this threat, and analysts warn
that terrorist organizations could utilize the trade in illegal wildlife as a
vector for the transmission of zoonotic diseases in a bioterrorist attack.70
As a result of these numerous threats to conservation efforts, any
scheme of environmental protection should include a comprehensive
framework that provides sufficient flexibility to incorporate a wide variety
of scenarios. For example, illegal poaching operations could co-opt trophy
hunting expeditions, or poachers could disguise an illegal hunt as a le-
gitimate safari.71 While observers should not conflate well-intentioned
63 Id. at 41.
64 See Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at viii (discussing the position of former Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton).
65 M. Brooke Darby, The Escalating International Wildlife Trafficking Crisis: Ecological, Eco-
nomic, and National Security Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 21, 2014), http://www.state
.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/2014/226421.htm [https://perma.cc/HTW2-BGFX]; see also Lorraine Elliot,
Fighting Transnational Environmental Crime, 66 J. INT’L AFF. 88 (2012) (estimating that
the annual value of transnational environmental crime ranges from $31–$40 billion).
66 Liana Sun Wyler & Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats
and U.S. Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (July 23, 2013), https://www.fas.org
/sgp/crs/misc/RL34395.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6M2-UHQ3].
67 See Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at viii.
68 Darby, supra note 65.
69 Wyatt, supra note 62, at 56–57.
70 Id. at 57.
71 This scenario is not farfetched. The U.S. Department of Justice filed an indictment
against the owners of Out of Africa Adventures, a safari company, with violations of the
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trophy hunting with illegal poaching operations, a disproportionate number
of trophy hunters originate in the United States,72 and situations like the
killing of Cecil the Lion by the American dentist, Walter Palmer, indicate
a need to consider the connection. Palmer paid $55,000 to hunt Cecil the
Lion.73 Given the end result of Palmer’s hunt, he clearly did not take care
to confirm that he conducted his hunt under legal circumstances.74 Had
Palmer inadvertently saddled up with a bogus safari company intent on
conducting illegal hunts, that money could have ended up in the hands
of any number of groups with nefarious motives. Similarly, as mentioned
above, the United States consumes substantial quantities of plant prod-
ucts that distributors may have illegally acquired in violation of the Lacey
Act.75 American consumers also regularly enjoy seafood potentially over-
fished under international quotas.76 The Lacey Act’s foreign laws incorpo-
ration provisions protect against each of these scenarios,77 and without
the foreign enforcement provisions, the United States would assume a
leading role in funding illegal activities occurring abroad.78
Lacey Act, claiming that the company was a front for poachers who would lure American
trophy hunters to Africa on the premise of providing a legal rhinoceros hunt, allow the
hunter to pose with the rhinoceros for pictures, leave with the hunter, and then later
return to the carcass to strip the horn for sale on the black market. As a result, the
poachers not only received the fee for the hunt, but also the value of the horn. Owners of
Safari Company Indicted for Illegal Rhino Hunts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/owners-safari-company-indicted-illegal-rhino-hunts
[https://perma.cc/TWA6-HPRB]; Indictment, U.S. v. Groenewald, No. 2.14-cr-00508
-WKW-SRW, 2014 WL 11256817 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 16, 2014).
72 Ann M. Simmons & Christina Littlefield, Cecil the Lion’s Killer Is Not Alone: Trophy
Hunters Disproportionately Americans, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2015), http://www.latimes
.com/world/africa/la-fg-lion-killing-20150728-story.html [https://perma.cc/X8XE-9ZK9].
73 Id.
74 See Nordwall, supra note 2 (Zimbabwean officials claim that Palmer failed to acquire
authorization to hunt Cecil the Lion). But see Matt DeLong, Read the Full Statement From
Walter Palmer on Killing of Cecil the Lion, STAR TRIBUNE (July 29, 2015), http://www
.startribune.com/read-the-full-statement-from-walter-palmer/318947551/#1 [https://perma
.cc/Z5BF-SKTJ] (Palmer claims that he believed that he had purchased a legal lion hunt).
75 Saltzman, supra note 45, at 2.
76 See, e.g., Ashley Lillian Erickson, Out of Stock: Strengthening International Fishery
Regulations to Achieve a Healthier Ocean, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 281, 308 (2008)
(the United States is the world’s second largest consumer of tuna).
77 See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 5–6.
78 Why Should Americans Have to Comply with the Laws of Foreign Nations: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs, 113th Cong.
103 (2013) (statement of Alexander von Bismarck, Executive Director, Environmental
Investigation Agency).
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B. Relying on Local Jurisprudence Alone to Prosecute Poachers
Cannot Succeed
While local officials have seen extraordinary successes in bringing
poachers and others who perpetrate wildlife crimes to justice,79 many
factors contribute to the failure of local law enforcement to stem the
rising rates of illegal activity. From local governance problems to eco-
nomic factors, many illegal actions go unpunished,80 and even diplomatic
concerns can prevent poachers from facing prosecution in the country in
which the illegal act occurred.81
1. Weak Governance
While proper enforcement of local criminal laws punishing the
taking of wildlife would represent the best proactive response to the global
conservation crisis, corruption and an epidemic of institutional weakness
prevent the enforcement of those laws.82 Where poachers face prosecution
by foreign governments, widespread corruption, mismanagement of local
engines of justice, and weak penalties for wildlife crimes cause many perpe-
trators to either go free or face minimal sentences.83 Many scholars and
policy analysts have written extensively about governance problems facing
many third world nations where poaching occurs, but none can agree on
a solution to these problems.84 As a result, onlookers simply should not
79 See generally Alexandra Gibbs, Could This Tech Kill Off Wildlife Poaching?, CNBC
(July 28, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/23/could-this-technology-kill-off-wildlife
-poaching.html (South Africa is experimenting with high tech approaches to prevent rhinoc-
eros poaching); Elephant Poachers Caught Red-handed in Indonesia, WORLD WILDLIFE
FUND GLOBAL (Feb. 26, 2015), http://wwf.panda.org/who_we_are/wwf_offices/indonesia
/?240094/Elephant-poachers-caught-red-handed-in-Indonesia [https://perma.cc/3TRE-F44F]
(Riau police break Indonesian poaching ring); In Kenya, Justice Catches Up with Elephant
Poacher, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 18, 2014), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com
/2014/11/18/in-kenya-justice-catches-up-with-elephant-poacher/ [https://perma.cc/EDG8
-Q46A] (Kenya Wildlife Service staff impressively utilize law enforcement surveillance
strategies to track escaped elephant poacher); Arwa Damon & Brent Swails, Poachers Are
the Prey in a Park in the Republic of Congo, CNN (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014
/01/06/world/africa/congo-poacher-camp-bust/ [https://perma.cc/P3VV-NHUA] (Congolese
eco-guards regularly disrupt poaching activities in the Republic of Congo).
80 Iain Douglas-Hamilton, Time Running Out to Save Elephants from Ivory Trade,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 31, 2013), http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2013/01/31
/time-running-out-to-save-elephants-from-ivory-trade/ [https://perma.cc/SC95-7D64].
81 See infra Section II.B.3.
82 Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at 9.
83 Douglas-Hamilton, supra note 80.
84 JOHN HANKS, OPERATION LOCK AND THE WAR ON RHINO POACHING, 204–06 (Sean
Fraser, ed., Penguin Books 2015).
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feel surprised when weaker foreign governments cannot protect local
wildlife from predatory actors.
In some extreme circumstances, the governments tasked with
protecting wildlife actually participate in the poaching.85 In Sudan and
South Sudan, for example, analysts reported that Sudanese, Congolese,
and Ugandan troops have all taken advantage of the weakness of these
post–civil war nations and gone on safaris.86 One may hope that the
profits from those expeditions will find their way into the wildlife en-
forcement budgets of those states, but this seems unlikely.
2. Disincentive to Local Prosecution and Enforcement of Local
Environmental Laws
Unfortunately, economic factors also incentivize the illegal wildlife
trade in many countries.87 Many nations that suffer the most from the
illegal wildlife trade also lack strong economies and opportunities for their
citizens to earn a fair living; thus, many people turn to the illegal wildlife
trade to acquire items that middle and upper class people in other countries
purchase.88 Moreover, the trade in illegal wildlife itself generates substan-
tial wealth for some poachers.89 While some subsistence poachers illegally
kill and sell wildlife merely to survive, the low-risk and high-reward
nature of poaching attracts opportunists searching for easy money.90
Additionally, even where foreign governments may want to stop
the illegal ivory trade, they may lack the necessary resources to wage a
real campaign against an organized poaching operation.91 In many coun-
tries across Africa, for example, elites view wildlife conservation policies
as luxuries rather than necessities.92 Because governments view these
policies as providing relatively little immediate benefit compared to imme-
diate cost, conservation policies often take a backseat to other policies such
as education and health infrastructure.93 As noted previously, products
of the illegal wildlife trade generate massive profits for its perpetrators,
85 See id. at 197 (describing the participation of game guards at Kruger National Park in
poaching operations).
86 See Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at 9–10.
87 WYATT, supra note 62, at 36.
88 Id.
89 Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at 18.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 9–10.
92 See HANKS, supra note 84, at 223.
93 Id.
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and as a result, organizations engaged in poaching have an incredible
source of potential funding.94 Even in South Africa, where the government
has begun to use its military to enforce wildlife conservation laws by pro-
viding logistical aid to park rangers and helicopter support, poachers still
make off with substantial catches.95 In many cases, foreign governments
simply cannot compete on the same level as well-financed poachers.96
3. The Problem with Extradition
Some legal scholars have noted that the extradition of U.S. citizens
who have violated foreign laws could serve as an alternative to the prose-
cution of U.S. citizens under the Lacey Act,97 but extradition alone cannot
substitute for the Lacey Act’s incorporation of foreign laws because of the
diplomatic and practical restrictions of the extradition process. Many coun-
tries have signed extradition treaties which would require the extradition
of U.S. citizens violating foreign environmental laws.98 Certainly, extra-
dition treaties facilitate the punishment of illegal wildlife dealers,99 but
extradition treaties likely cannot directly impact demand for illegal
wildlife as effectively as the Lacey Act’s broad provisions allow.100 Due to
the dual criminality requirement for extradition, officials in other countries
normally cannot drag U.S. consumers abroad simply because the consumer
purchased illegally taken ivory, especially where the transaction occurred
online.101 Additionally, practical problems exist because the requesting
94 See supra Section II.A.
95 HANKS, supra note 84, at 223–24.
96 Lawson & Vines, supra note 59, at 9–10.
97 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the Constitutional
Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 435 (2015).
98 Jim Rubin, DOJ’s Role in Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18
NAT. RES. & ENV’T 39, 40–41 (2004).
99 Id. at 41 (discussing how international cooperation during the extradition of Anson
Wong resulted in the punishment of a prolific dealer in illegal wildlife).
100 Id. at 39–40.
101 See Arin Greenwood, Dentist Who Killed Cecil the Lion Could Be Extradited to Zimbabwe,
THE WORLD POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/walter-palmer
-extradition_us_55b8ce10e4b0a13f9d1ad47d?jhalwhfr= [https://perma.cc/M6C8-VA8G]
(extradition requires that the commission of the crime occurred in the requesting country
and necessitates “dual criminality,” meaning the act must incur criminal penalties in both
countries); see also Jessica B. Izzo, PC Pets for a Price: Combatting Online and Traditional
Wildlife Crime Through International Harmonization and Authoritative Policies, 34 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 965, 992–93 (2010)(noting that the international extra-
dition process under CITES for wildlife crime remains outdated in an internet age).
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country normally pays the costs of extradition,102 and foreign nations may
not believe that punishing certain petty offenders justifies the cost.103
Extradition treaties do maintain relevance in high-profile poach-
ing cases, such as Walter Palmer’s, where the alleged poacher has left
the country prior to the filing of formal charges.104 Since the killing of
Cecil the Lion, Zimbabwe has charged two men, including one of Palmer’s
local guides, for hunting Cecil without the required permits.105 Zimbabwe
also expressed interest in extraditing Palmer, but U.S. officials have
not received a formal extradition request.106 As a result, prosecution in
Zimbabwe appears unlikely.107 In deciding whether to request Palmer’s
extradition, Zimbabwean officials (and officials in other nations under
similar circumstances) must weigh a number of factors, including not
only the likelihood of conviction and cost of a trial, but also whether the
United States would comply with an extradition request in the first
place.108 The United States may have chosen not to extradite Palmer
because of Zimbabwe’s poor human rights record.109 If a country doubts
whether it can convince another nation to comply with an extradition
request, it may not even ask, if only to avoid embarrassment.110 While
extradition can serve as an effective tool to ensure justice for poachers
who cross national borders, the diplomatic and practical realities of
extradition appear to limit its benefits.111
102 Marian Nash Leich, Extradition, 76 AM. U. J. INT’L L. 154, 157 (1982).
103 Valerie Epps, The Development of the Conceptual Framework Supporting International
Extradition, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 369, 374 (2002).
104 Arin Greenwood, U.S. Government to Lion-Killing Dentist: Hey, Can You Give Us a
Call?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2015, 3:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/walter-palmer-fish-and-wildlife-service_55ba7055e4b0b8499b18ba97 [https://perma.cc
/49V3-EWR7].
105 Miller, supra note 2.
106 Greenwood, supra note 101.
107 Id.
108 See Danny Cevallos, Can Zimbabwe Have Lion’s Killer Extradited?, CNN (Aug. 1,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/01/opinions/cevallos-can-dentist-be-extradited/ [https://
perma.cc/DQ69-8K82] (aside from the fact that the United States may have obligations
under an extradition treaty, Zimbabwe surely recognizes that it cannot enforce the
extradition treaty if the United States declines to extradite Palmer for any reason).
109 Peta Thornycroft, & Aislinn Laing, Cecil the lion: Zimbabwe Requests Extradition of
US Dentist Walter Palmer Over Killing, THE TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2015), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/11775270/Cecil-the-lion
-Zimbabwe-requesting-Walter-Palmers-extradition.html [https://perma.cc/CFL5-WL6V].
110 See Cevallos, supra note 108.
111 Id. See also Epps, supra note 103, at 374 (noting that some countries may not believe
that certain crimes justify the costs of extradition, and thus will not ask).
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C. The Benefits of Proactive Approaches to Conservation
As noted previously, the global conservation crisis occurs in real
time and reported incidents of poaching have spiked dramatically.112 This
increase in poaching has caused a decline in the population of many
species not listed as endangered for the purposes of the Endangered
Species Act, as was the case with the African lion.113 While the U.S. Gov-
ernment recently placed the African lion on the listing of endangered
species, at the time of Cecil the Lion’s killing, the African lion was un-
protected despite the rapidly declining lion population.114 Some speculate
that the United States lists lions now only due to the public outcry over
Cecil’s death; had Palmer not shot Cecil, the lion would probably have
remained off the endangered species list.115
While the Endangered Species Act has succeeded immensely in
protecting species from extinction,116 it embodies an “emergency-room
mentality.”117 The Endangered Species Act allowed for the rehabilitation
of many species, such as sea otters and black-footed ferrets, and it has
prevented endangered species from becoming extinct.118 Despite these
successes, however, only one percent of species ever made it off the list.119
If environmentalists want to protect ecosystems from a loss of biodiver-
sity, conservation efforts should focus on maintaining species in the wild
in sustainable, if not vibrant, numbers, not just ensuring their survival
in zoos and wildlife refuges.
Additional tangible benefits flow from protecting species in the wild.
Maintaining large populations of animals and plants in the wild gener-
ates local commerce in foreign nations through ecotourism and provides
112 See supra Section II.A.
113 Erica Goode, After Cecil Furor, U.S. Aims to Protect Lions Through Endangered Species
Act, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/science/us-to-protect
-african-lions-under-endangered-species-act.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5XZP-9Y9V].
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Endangered Species Act by the Numbers, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION (Feb. 1, 2006),
https://www.nwf.org/pdf/Wildlife/esabythenumbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S4R-QUFM].
117 Carden, supra note 12, at 204.
118 Id. at 217.
119 NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 116. (Fish & Wildlife has only removed 37
domestic species from the U.S. Endangered Species List since the passage of the Endan-
gered Species Act.) Louis Jacobson, Only 1 Percent of Endangered Species List Have Been
Taken off List, says Cynthia Lummis, POLITIFACT (Sept. 3, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www
.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/sep/03/cynthia-lummis/endangered-species
-act-percent-taken-off-list/ [https://perma.cc/29JS-74XX].
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recreational activities for the community.120 If hunting, fishing, and
wildlife recreational activities in the United States alone aggregated to
form one unified corporation, it would draw the country’s seventh largest
corporate revenues, with $108 billion per year.121 Certainly, those busi-
nesses would not prosper without large numbers of flora and fauna living
in diverse ecosystems. For example, when Yellowstone Park reintroduced
large numbers of great wolves (then threatened with extinction) into the
wild, revenues increased by $10 million annually.122 While the Endan-
gered Species Act plays a major role in safeguarding fragile species, only
proactive conservation policies will provide sufficient protection for
species and the communities that benefit from naturally diverse ecosys-
tems. While policymakers should take additional global action, the Lacey
Act provides a powerful framework to stem the illegal wildlife trade by
providing federal agents with a mandate to track the global supply of
illegal wildlife products and prosecute violators.123
III. WHY THE LACEY ACT WORKS
The international scope of wildlife trafficking and related activities,
while providing a vast market for illegal goods, also creates a significant
weakness: almost all illegal wildlife trade in today’s globalized economy
will involve moving illegal items through interstate or foreign com-
merce.124 As a result, both sellers and buyers will fall under the Lacey
Act’s jurisdiction.125 Even if the federal government discovers a violation
of the Lacey Act after it has already occurred, the government can seize
any illegal items such as ivory under the Act’s civil forfeiture provision,
which provides a substantial demand-side deterrent for purchasers.126
While imperfect, the Lacey Act provides the requisite breadth to ensure
that global conservation laws have teeth. This section will discuss the
reason for the success of the Lacey Act’s mechanics while also advocating
against either splintering or repealing the Act’s foreign law provisions.
120 NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 116.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See Saltzman, supra note 45, at 5–8; Gilbert, supra note 15, at 5; see also H.R. REP. 71-
7 at 181–82 (1929).
124 Anderson, supra note 23, at 29–30.
125 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2012).
126 Anderson, supra note 23, at 72.
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A. Structural Reasons for the Efficacy of the Lacey Act
While the importance of the Lacey Act to global conservation efforts
derives from its substantive prohibitions contained in 16 U.S.C. § 3372,127
the Act’s true force results from its penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 3373 authorizes
federal prosecutors to pursue sizeable criminal and civil penalties for
Lacey Act violations, and multiple mens rea standards provide a degree
of flexibility for prosecutors in determining how to charge defendants.128
1. Sizeable Criminal and Civil Penalties Deter Violators
Under the Lacey Act, violators can face an array of civil and
criminal charges.129 Additionally, the government can seize the proceeds
and products from illegal trade under the Act’s civil forfeiture provi-
sions.130 The Lacey Act’s civil penalties provide a levy of potentially hefty
fines, including a $10,000 fine for each violation of the Lacey Act unless
the value of the fish, wildlife, and plants amounts to less than $350.131 As
a result, if a purchaser in the United States bought twelve rhinoceros
horns illegally, the civil fines could reach $120,000. A “due care” stan-
dard governs the levy of civil penalties, and it essentially equates to the
reasonable person standard of care for negligence violations.132
Criminal violations of the Lacey Act take two different forms. First,
knowingly violating the Lacey Act by disobeying an underlying predicate
law can result in fines of $20,000 per violation and not more than five
years in prison.133 In other words, a U.S. citizen who travels overseas and
poaches twelve rhinoceros horns and tries to bring those horns through
U.S. customs, when the citizen knows that the ivory was obtained ille-
gally, could face $240,000 in criminal fines and up to sixty years in a
federal prison. Such strong penalties likely strike fear into the hearts of
127 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2015).
128 Id. at § 3373.
129 Id.
130 Id. at § 3374; see also U.S. v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus
Argus Lobster Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385, 390–91 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (the Lacey Act provides
no innocent owner defense); Krost, supra note 23, at 63–64 (the civil forfeiture require-
ments impose strict liability and can result in seizure of illegal items under a preponderance
of the evidence standard).
131 16 U.S.C. § 3373(a)(1) (2015).
132 Why Should Americans Have to Comply with the Laws of Foreign Nations: Hearing
before the H. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs, 113th Cong.
3 (2013) (statement of Marcus A. Asner, Arnold Porter, LLP); see also infra Section II.A.2.
133 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d)(1) (2015).
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those actively participating in the illegal ivory trade. Second, the Lacey
Act also imposes $10,000 in criminal fines and no more than one year of
imprisonment for violations of the Lacey Act by disobeying an underlying
predicate law when the perpetrator should have known, with the exercise
of due care, that the wildlife was taken illegally.134 Here again, twelve
illegal rhinoceros horns equates to $120,000 in criminal fines and up to
twelve years of imprisonment for violations of the due care standard.
2. The “Due Care” Standard for Civil and Criminal Violations
By encouraging compliance with predicate laws, the Lacey Act’s
“due care” standard drains the demand for products of the illegal wildlife
trade. For example, as the timber industry learns to adapt to new regula-
tion under the Lacey Act, it will learn to develop best practices for com-
pliance that will both lower costs for the industry and detract from the
demand for illegal timber products.135 As noted above, the “due care”
standard most likely comports with a standard negligence formulation.136
The Ninth Circuit’s model jury instructions corroborate this theory,
stating that “due care means that degree of care which a reasonably pru-
dent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”137
While courts have not shed much light on what must occur to satisfy the
due care standard, businesses and individual buyers can likely satisfy
the standard of care by following industry customs, complying with
available legal information, and acting in good faith.138 At least one court
has indicated that more experienced businessmen may face higher bur-
dens of due care because knowledge of the trade should have alerted the
defendant to potential illegality.139 Regardless of how courts define the
due care standard, buyers should have sufficient motivation under the
Lacey Act to avoid questionable sellers and investigate the origins of
wildlife products.140
134 16 U.S.C. § 3373(d)(2) (2015).
135 Saltzman, supra note 45, at 7–8.
136 Why Should Americans Have to Comply With the Laws of Foreign Nations: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs, 113th Cong.
3 (2013) (statement of Marcus A. Asner, Arnold Porter, LLP).
137 MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH CIR., § 9.13 (2010), http://www.rid.uscourts.gov/menu
/judges/jurycharges/OtherPJI/9th%20Circuit%20Model%20Criminal%20Jury%20
Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8YR-W8W7].
138 Saltzman, supra note 45, at 5–8.
139 United States v. Proceeds from Sale of Approximately 15,538 Panulirus Argus Lobster
Tails, 834 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D Fla. 1993).
140 See Shepard, supra note 16, at 84.
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Moreover, the “due care” standard provides an additional element
of deterrence by adding another arrow in the quiver of prosecutors for
Lacey Act violation prosecutions. If a prosecutor cannot prove that a
defendant knowingly violated the Lacey Act, enough evidence may exist
to prove that the defendant should have known of violations. Overall, the
Lacey Act serves as a powerful deterrent to wildlife crimes. If the U.S.
government adequately enforced the Lacey Act, demand for illegal products
would drop substantially, which would critically weaken the illegal market
as a whole.141
B. A Piecemeal Approach to International Conservation Will Fail
Without the Lacey Act’s broad incorporation of foreign laws, sub-
stantial enforcement gaps would exist.142 In fact, Congressman Lacey
initially proposed the Lacey Act to provide a mechanism for the uniform en-
forcement of the piecemeal conservation regimes that existed within the
United States at the time.143 Prior to the passage of the Lacey Act, a hunter
could shoot a bird in one state, evade capture, and then successfully
transport to, and sell the feathers in, some other state where the hunter
would enjoy immunity from prosecution.144 Lacey’s evasive pot hunter
problem would exist contemporaneously on a much larger scale today in a
world without the Lacey Act, but instead of pot hunters peddling feathers,
today’s poachers move large quantities of illicit ivory, fish, and timber
across international borders.145 In this way, the Lacey Act’s international
trade hook to incorporate foreign laws provides a superior method of
attaining jurisdiction when compared to direct piecemeal regulation.
Any alternative to the Lacey Act’s admittedly vague foreign laws
provision would need to entail the passage of direct penalties similar to
the structure of the Endangered Species Act—a “codebook” for conservation
violations abroad punishable under U.S. federal law.146 If the codebook
141 Patricia Elias, Logging and the Law: How the U.S. Lacey Act Helps Reduce Illegal
Logging in the Tropics, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, (Apr. 2012), http://www.ucs
usa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/illegal-logging-and
-lacey-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJE9-UJRZ].
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Instrument Manufacturing, 42 ENVTL. L. 549, 570–71 (2012).
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mimicked the effect of foreign law incorporation under the Lacey Act,
then it would ultimately fail to simplify the current system. As commen-
tators have noted, the number of foreign laws that the Lacey Act func-
tionally incorporates literally boggles the mind; if courts considered only
the conservation laws of Indonesia, over 9,000 foreign laws could poten-
tially enter into American jurisprudence.147 Even if Congress set out
every foreign law regulating conservation in detail and in English within
either the U.S. Code or the Code of Federal Regulations to allow for direct
enforcement, the resulting morass would become so unwieldy as to make
effective use impractical, if not impossible.148 Additionally, the codebook
would require updating each time a foreign law changed, creating a sub-
stantial burden of upkeep.
Presumably, however, if lawmakers did enact a piecemeal codebook,
the drafters would not actually want to directly incorporate every foreign
conservation law.149 Washington lawmakers would inevitably disagree
about which laws provided necessary environmental protections, which
would spawn a political process where lobbyists and special interest groups
could exercise a great deal of control.150 The resulting conservation scheme
would include both overinclusive and underinclusive regulation.151 The
reason that the Endangered Species Act’s direct penalties work well
stems from the objective criteria promulgated to include a species on the
list, such as threat to habitat or overutilization.152 The criteria reasonably
confine the list to a manageable number of species that interested parties
must track, and the Act has successfully protected all but ten of the
roughly 1,400 species listed.153 No such objective criteria could determine
which foreign laws to incorporate; if such criteria did exist, the drafters
of the Endangered Species Act probably would have already incorporated
any additional protection into that law. Congress premised the Lacey
147 Id. at 564.
148 Why Should Americans Have to Comply With the Laws of Foreign Nations: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs, 113th Cong.
119 (2013) (statement of Marcus A. Asner, Arnold Porter, LLP).
149 Id.
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153 The Endangered Species Act: A Wild Success, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
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2016] ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE IN THE CROSSHAIRS 343
Act’s incorporation of foreign conservation laws on the assumption that
foreign countries understood their own conservation needs best.154 Law-
makers likely could not craft a truly comprehensive codebook simply
because they could never fully brief themselves on every conservation
crisis occurring in every country.155 Due to the pitfalls associated with
direct piecemeal incorporation of foreign laws, Congress should not
abandon the current comprehensive approach.
In fact, some legal scholars have gone so far as to suggest that
other nations adopt their own versions of the Lacey Act.156 Despite the
fact that 181 countries have signed onto CITES,157 many signatory nations
have done little to nothing to implement broad conservation policies.158
While many countries may never enact comprehensive conservation laws,
those that enacted such laws have historically looked to the United States
as a model for conservation governance.159 For example, after Congress
passed the 2008 amendments to the Lacey Act, China revised its policy
on illegal timber imports.160 Curtailing the Lacey Act’s foreign law provi-
sions now would send the wrong signal to the international community
and imply that the United States does not care to ensure that interna-
tional trade occurs responsibly.161 If the United States turns back the clock
on its conservation policy, other countries may follow suit and choose to
154 H.Rep. 71-7 at 181–82 (1929).
155 Id.
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international community should be encouraged to adopt legislation similar to the United
States’ Lacey Act, whose stringent civil and criminal penalties encourage traders to abide
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not adopt globally relevant conservation laws. Due to the scope of global
conservation crises, the United States should lead by maintaining the
Lacey Act’s global conservation protections.162
C. An Internal Solution to Overcriminalization
As discussed above, the Lacey Act’s incorporation of foreign laws
provides the penalties necessary to preserve global conservation efforts.163
Even so, the critics of the Lacey Act correctly point out that foreign law
incorporation will “overcriminalize” some U.S. citizens who may not real-
ize the illegality of certain activities conducted abroad.164 That said, any
proposed solution cannot simply eliminate foreign law incorporation as
the FOCUS Act would.165 Federal agencies tasked with enforcement of
the Lacey Act can, and should, instead alleviate the overcriminalization
problem internally through regulation of the enforcement process. For
example, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service has considered implementing a de minimis exception
“for items containing minimal amounts of plant material.”166
Precedent exists for promulgating this type of internal policy in the
context of the Endangered Species Act.167 In 1998, the Clinton administra-
tion issued a policy change limiting prosecutions under the Endangered
Species Act by requiring federal prosecutors to demonstrate a knowing
mental state prior to filing charges.168 The so-called McKittrick Policy has
resulted in litigation and criticism due to the substantial limitation it
places on federal prosecutors in punishing those who take the lives of
endangered species;169 however, such a policy may make sense in the
162 Beth Allgood, Marina Redford, & Peter LaFontaine, U.S. Ivory Trade: Can a Crackdown
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167 Deborah Schoch, Policy Limits Endangered Species Act Prosecutions, L.A. TIMES
(June 22, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/22/nation/na-species22 [https://perma
.cc/5L56-Y3LC].
168 Id.
169 Judy Calman, Groups Sue U.S. for Failure to Prosecute Under the Endangered Species
Act, WILD EARTH GUARDIANS (July 23, 2015), http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site
/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8579&news_iv_ctrl=1194#.ViGgXvmrTWI [https://perma
.cc/4WDS-CL24]; Julie Cart, U.S. Sued Over Policy on Killing Endangered Wildlife, L.A.
2016] ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE IN THE CROSSHAIRS 345
context of the Lacey Act. The McKittrick Policy’s problem results from
the fact that would-be violators of the Endangered Species Act have easy
access to information on the status of a species and can easily determine
whether the federal government lists a species as endangered or threat-
ened due to the federal government’s publication of endangered species
in the Federal Register.170 This is not so under the Lacey Act.
The critics of the Lacey Act argue that the sheer number of foreign
laws that qualify as predicate laws under the Act create an impossible
burden for U.S. citizens traveling abroad to understand all possible foreign
laws.171 Similarly, the Lacey Act appears to place a large burden on U.S.
consumers that import natural products of questionable origins.172 To an
extent, this concern seems justified, and while American hunters abroad
probably should exercise substantial due diligence both in planning
hunts and abiding by all foreign laws, mistakes happen.173 By way of ex-
ample, if Walter Palmer’s statements disclaiming knowledge of the
questionable nature of his hunt of Cecil the Lion accurately describe his
state of mind before the hunt, then perhaps public policy would justify
prosecutorial restraint.174
After all, no database of Zimbabwean laws currently exists on-
line,175 and no federal database exists that details all foreign activities
made illegal under the Lacey Act.176 As a result, American tourists under-
standably might rely on travel advice websites that briefly summarize
local laws.177 Additionally, foreign governments often do not write their
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laws in English or provide English translations.178 Regardless of the numer-
ous problems that arise when one tries to learn foreign law, case law
interpreting the Lacey Act has long held that ignorance of foreign laws
is still no excuse.179 While Americans abroad necessarily risk prosecution
in foreign countries for violating foreign laws, a policy limiting U.S. prose-
cution for violations of those laws may make practical sense. In the case
of Cecil the Lion, Fish & Wildlife might want to consider not prosecuting
Palmer’s violation of Zimbabwean laws if the agency concludes that
Palmer’s guides assured him of the hunt’s legality. Congress passed the
Lacey Act to stop the illegal trade of wildlife, so if criminal penalties mean
to deter wildlife crime, punishing truly innocent violators may not com-
port with the purposes of the law.180 When one buys ivory, the buyer should
have notice that illegal ivory commonly finds its way into the market-
place and should take precautions, but when buying guitars few will find
reason to suspect that the guitar’s wood came from an illegal harvest.181
The Lacey Act cannot deter innocent buyers if the innocent buyers do not
realize that they committed violations of foreign law.
CONCLUSION
The incorporation of foreign laws into the Lacey Act remains neces-
sary to the deterrence and punishment of illegal wildlife crime around
the globe. Billions of dollars of illegal products move through U.S. ports
each year, and the Lacey Act helps to ensure that buyers of products that
may come from that illegal supply check the origins of those items.182 Due
to the substantial price that defendants would pay from violations of the
Lacey Act, strong mechanisms to ensure compliance exist under the cur-
rent formulation of the Act.183 The resulting benefits to global conserva-
tion efforts and biodiversity far outstrip the costs of enforcement.
Admittedly, Fish & Wildlife has utilized the Lacey Act to prosecute
some absurd cases including an instance of lobster poaching in which the
178 See Larkin, supra note 97, at 387.
179 U.S. v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1982).
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jurisdiction where the defendant committed the crime no longer recog-
nized the predicate law, and the case of Gibson Guitar in which the
government seized substantial quantities of illegal timber imports from a
potentially innocent buyer.184 While observers could describe those in-
stances as examples of the Lacey Act’s overcriminalization of American
citizens,185 those cases do not reflect the broader scope of the Lacey Act’s
enforcement. The Lacey Act also punishes violators for very serious offenses
such as the illegal poaching of rhinoceroses overseas,186 and while the
Endangered Species Act may punish the perpetrators of those crimes in
some cases, only the Lacey Act strikes at the heart of the demand for
products of the illegal wildlife trade.187 Congress should reject calls to strip
foreign law incorporation from the Lacey Act in response to outlier cases,
especially when the Lacey Act performs so much good. The solution to solve
overcriminalization under the Lacey Act lies not with repeal of the act, but
instead with restrictions on Fish & Wildlife’s enforcement policies. Fish
& Wildlife chose to prosecute Gibson Guitar even though prosecutors may
have determined that the company did not intentionally break any laws.
Cases of Lacey Act overcriminalization justify changes in internal policy,
not repeal of a law that has proven invaluable in the fight to preserve the
environment. The Lacey Act still plays a vital role in preserving species
around the globe. Calls to limit its scope can only encourage the entire
market for illegal wildlife products to redouble their nefarious efforts.
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